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Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District:
Opening the Floodgates in Local Special Government
Elections
In judicial review of the constitutionality of representational
structures at the local governmental level, each citizen's constitutional right to equal representation must be reconciled with the need
for flexibility in designing local structures. Last term, in Salyer Land
Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District,1 the Supreme
Court faced this problem in the context of a water storage district.
It upheld a statute that both restricted the franchise in the election
of district directors to district landowners and allocated votes on the
basis of the assessed value of the land owned by each voter. 2 This
Note will first analyze the merits and deficiencies of the techniques
that the Court used in dealing with problems of local elections
prior to Salyer and, against that background, will discuss the
techniques used in Salyer to reconcile the competing policies. It is
the thesis of this Note that the Salyer method is suitable for resolving
the tension between the• need for local structural flexibility and the
constitutional right to equal representation and that the result
reached in that case was proper. However, as the discussion of Salyer
will reveal, the method has a potential for misapplication. The determination of when the need for local flexibility should override
the constitutional right requires a more careful examination of the
re/evant factors than the Salyer opinion indicates that the Court will
perform. Although the result in Salyer seems sound, a superficial
analysis in future cases could give inadequate protection to the constitutional right.
1. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
2. A companion case, Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement
Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973) (per curiam), upheld a watershed district voting scheme that
allowed only landowners to vote and weighted the voting according to acreage within
the district owned by each voter.
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The right to effective representation was developed by the Court
in a series of opinions involving malapportionment or restrictions on
the exercise of the franchise in federal and state legislative elections.3
The Court subjected the justifications for such infringements to
strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause4 on the ground that
0

3. The Court has essentially I1eld that equal protection of the laws is denied
when state legislative and congressional districts contain unequal numbers of people. In
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1963), the Court held that the Constitution requires that
congressional districting schemes be based on substantial equality of population among
the various districts in order that the Constitution's fundamental goal of "equal representation for equal numbers of people" be achieved. 376 U.S. at 18. In Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court examined Alabama's malapportioned state representative
districts and enunciated the requirement that the seats in both houses of the state
legislature be apportioned on a population basis.
The Court occasionally couched its analysis in terms of the need to protect the
right of each voter to equal participation in the political process via his ballot. See, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964): "[T)he Equal Protection Clause guarantees
the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators."
However, the basic holdings of the reapportionment cases established the requirement
that districts be apportioned so that they contain equal populations, and no attempt
was made to ensure that equal numbers of people actually voted for each representa•
tive. Therefore, the basic requirement in apportionment could accurately be said to be a
protection of the right to live in an equally apportioned district, the Court's functional
definition of equal representation. For a full discussion of this point, see Note, Reappo,·tionment on the Sub-State Level of Government: Equal Representation or Equal
Vote?, 50 B.U. L. REv. 231 (1970).
4. By the time of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), two standards of review had
begun to evolve in equal protection cases. For a full discussion of these standards as
used during the Warren Court era, see Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1968). For an earlier study, see Tussman &: tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 341 (1949).
The first and older standard was the "rational relationship" test, which the Court has
primarily used in considering social and economic regulations. Under this standard,
"[s]tate legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). Two analytic steps are
implicit in this approach: The statute must have a permissible legislative purpose,
and the classification must be reasonably related to that purpose. See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra, at 1077-87. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York,
336 U.S. 106 (1949): Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotcll v. Board of River Port
Pilot Commrs., 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
In certain cases, however, the Court has required the state to bear a heavier burden
of justification. ,vhen the Court has detected that a "suspect classification" is present in
the statute, it has subjected the classification to strict scrutiny and demanded that it
be "shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest." Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971), quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969) (emphasis original). Statutory classifications that have been regarded as "suspect"
now include race, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), national origin, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and alienage. Graham v. Ricllardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971).
Similarly, when the Court has determined that a "fundamental interest" is involved,
it has subjected the classification to the stricter test. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969). Interests regarded as fundamental by the Court include the right to
procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the right to travel, Shapiro v.
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the right to equal representation5 is fundamental in a democratic society because it safeguards other important rights. 6 The Court's ideal
was equal political influence for every citizen in the selection of
members of general legislative bodies, for all citizens are equally
affected by the decisions of those bodies. Equal population districting
was chosen as the institutional standard that would best achieve that
goal.7 Unless deviations from this institutional norm could be justiThompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and the right to vote. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964).
With regard to the right to vote, in San Antonio Independent School Dist, V,
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court emphasized that "[t]he constitutional under•
pinnings of the right to equal treatment in the voting process can no longer be
doubted even though, as the Court noted in Harper v. Virginia Bd, of Elections, , , ,
'the right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned.'" 411 U.S. at 34
n.74, quoting 383 U.S. 663, 665. The Rodriguez Court also noted that "the protected
right ••• to participate in state elections on an equal basis with other qualified
voters whenever the State has adopted an elective process for determining who will rep•
resent any segment of the State's population" is "implicit in our constitutional system.''
411 U.S. at 35 n.78. See also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (right to vote
"close to the core of our constitutional system'). The Court has applied strict scrutiny to
cases involving the malapportionment of congressional districts, Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
394 U.S. 526 (1969), the malapportionment of state legislative districts, Lucas v. Forty•
Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964), and voter residency requirements. Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
In most cases the choice between the rational relationship and the strict scrutiny
tests has determined the outcome of the case. The subjection of a statute to stritt
scrutiny has usually meant that the classification will be held invalid. See Dunn V, Blum•
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). But cf, Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), In two
recent decisions, 50-day voter residency requirements were sustained under the strict
scrutiny test. Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Martson v, Lewis, 410 U.S. 679
(1973). Subjection of a clasdfication to the rational relationship test has usually re•
suited in validation of the statute. See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protec•
tion, supra, at 1087. But see Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). For a discussion of
several recent cases in which the Court has applied the rational relationship test in
a more rigorous manner, see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec•
tion, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1972).
5. Although the Court has often seemed to be concerned with the need to protect
the individual citizen's right to vote, see, e.g., Reynolds v, Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62
(1964) ("the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society'),
the Court in Reynolds proclaimed that "achieving ••• fair and effective representation
for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment.'' 377 U.S. at
565-66.
6. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964): "Undoubtedly, the right of
suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the
right to e."ercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other
basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement on the right of citizens to vote
must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.'' See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Jl8 U.S.
89, 96 (1886).
7. See note 3_ supra. Commentators have criticized the Court for camouflaging the
imposition of a standard of what constitutes a republican form of government under
the guise of implementing the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Kauper, Some Com•
ments on the Reapportionment Cases, 63 MICH. L. REv. 243, 244 (1964) (the Court has
centered its attention on a "specious conception of personal right rather than upon the
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fied by a compelling reason, the Court mandated its implementation. 8 Only recently has the Court tolerated a, slight deviation from
strict numerical equality in state legislative redistricting when that
was necessary to accommodate a state policy of preserving political
subdivision lines.9
In Avery v. Midland County 10 the Court first required equal
population districting for a general governing body at the local govinstitutional aspect of the problem"); Note, Reapportionment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1226,
1242 (1966) ("denying a person the right to vote is different from establishing electoral
districts containing unequal population').
As many commentators have pointed out, a mathematically equal population dis•
tricting scheme is not tailored to provide representation for all voters, for minority
voters in a district will have no "representation" in the legislature. See Dixon, The Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of "One Man-One Vote", 1969 SUP. Cr. REv.
219, 227. Proportional representation or "interest group" voting would guarantee
that each voter has some representatjon. See Kauper, supra, at 227; Note, supra, at 1242.
One commentator has countered criticisms of equal population districting as a vehicle
for effective representation by arguing that a system of proportional or interest group
representation would be antithetical to the American political tradition of compromise
in that it would create sharp divisions on political issues. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 SUP. Cr. REv. 1, 54.
8. 'I;he first case to articulate fully the basic standard of equal population districting
was Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1963), a case involving congressional districts. The
Court struck down Georgia's congressional districting scheme on the basis of article I,
section 2, of the Constitution, which requires that Representatives be chosen "by the
People of the several States." The Court interpreted this section as requiring "as nearly
as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as
another's." 376 U.S. at 7-8. For state legislative apportionment, the Court held, in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), that the equal protection clause mandated that "a
State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its
legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable." 377 U.S. at 577. This was
essentially the Wesberry standard, but the Court in Reynolds noted that there might be
"[s]omewhat more flexibility ... with respect to state legislative apportionment than
in congressional districting." 377 U.S. at 578.
Since these early cases, the Court has further developed the standards to be applied
to both congressional and state legislative districting. In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S.
526 (1969), the Court noted that the "nearly as practicable" standard of voter equality
enunciated in Wesberry for congressional districts requires that the legislature make a
"good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality . . . • Unless population
variances among Congressioµal districts are shown to have resulted despite such effort,
the State must justify each variance, no matter how small." 394 U.S. at 530-31. See also
Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969) (companion case). In Mahan v. Howell, 410
U.S. 315 (1973), the Court focused its attention on the standard to be applied in state
legislative districting and noted that "the constitutionality of Virginia's legislative redistricting plan [is] not to be judged by the more stringent standard that Kirkpatrick
and Wells make applicable to congressional reapportionment, but instead by the equal
protection test enunciated in Reynolds v. Sims ...•" 410 U.S. at 324. Under the latter
standard, the Court can take into consideration factors that could not be considered
under the Kirkpatrick standard. The Court noted in Mahan that "[a]pplication of the
'absolute equality' test of Kirkpatrick and Wells to state legislative redistricting may
impair the normal functioning of state and local governments." 410 U.S. at 323.
9. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973). The Court sustained a districting plan
in which one district was overrepresented by 6.8 per cent and another was underrepresented by 9.6 per cent. 410 U.S. at 319.
10. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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ernmental level. The Court found that, since units of local government are arms of the state and are becoming increasingly important to their citizens,11 they are subject to the constraints of equal
protection to the same degree as the state.12 However, it was apparent
even before Avery13 that more specialized analytic tools would be
11. The Avery Court said:
"[I]nstitutions of local government have always been a major aspect of our system,
and their responsible and responsive operation is today of increasing importance
to the quality of life of more and more of our citizens. We therefore see httle dif•
fcrence, in terms of the application of the Equal Protection Clause, and of the prin•
ciples of Reynolds v. Sims, between the exercise of state power through legislatures
and its exercise by elected officials in the cities, towns and counties."
390 U.S. at 481.
12. The equal protection clause reaches the exercise of state power however mani•
fcsted, whether exercised directly or through subdivisions of the State•
. • • If voters residing in oversize districts arc denied their constitutional right
to participate in the election of state legislators, precisely the same kind of deprivation occurs when the members of a city council, school board or county governing
board are elected from districts of substantially unequal population.
390 U.S. at 479-80.
13. Two cases decided before Avery demonstrate the Court's awareness that equal
representation doctrines could not be automatically applied to local government. Sailors
v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967), involved a challenge to the validity of the
electoral scheme for the Kent County (Michigan) School Board, the members of which
were selected, not by the electors of the county, but by delegates chosen by the local
school boards. Each board sent a delegate to a biennial meeting, and these delegates
elected a five-member county board, the members of which were not required to be
members of the local boards. The Court, assuming arguendo that the principles of
Reynolds would apply to the election of local officials, held that this representational
scheme was not subject to constitutional challenge on the basis of Reynolds because it
was appointive, rather than elective. 387 U.S. at lll. The Court said that there was no
reason why officials, such as the county school board members in Sailors, who were non•
legislative, could not be appointed instead of elected. 387 U.S. at 108. The Court left
unresolved the question whether a local legislative body (such as a city council) could
be appointed rather than elected. 387 U.S. at 109-10. For an interesting argument that
elections might, in some instances, be required, see Nahmod, Reflections on Appointive
Local Government Bodies and the Right to an Election, 11 DUQUESNE L. REv. 119 (1972),
The second case was Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967). That case arose out of the
consolidation of the City of Virginia Beach with adjoining Princess Anne County, and
the adoption of a borough form of government for the resulting unit. There were
seven boroughs, with varying populations, in the consolidated city. The most populous
contained 29,048 people, while the least populous had 733. The city charter, approved
by the state legislature, provided that there were to be 11 councilmen for the city, all
elected at-large. However, while four of the eleven could be elected without regard to
residence, each of the remaining seven had to reside in a different borough. The Court
held that this scheme did not violate the equal protection clause. The plan, the Court
noted, used boroughs merely as a basis for residence and not for representation, so that,
despite the residency requirement, each council member represented the whole city. 387
U.S. at 115. Nevertheless, it is clear that this plan gave the rural (and le3S populous)
boroughs more representation on the council than sheer numbers would othenvise have
allocated to them, because those council members residing in the less populous rural
boroughs would presumably have more familiarity with rural problems and would in
fact represent rural voters better than they would urban voters. The plan was an en•
ticement for rural areas to enter the metropolitan government. See 387 U.S. at 117.
One commentator suggested after Sailors and Dusch that the Court was uncertain
about its ability to remedy inequities at the local level without disrupting the pattern
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needed to deal with the problems of representation in local government because local units vary in the functions they perform and in
their effects on local residents.14 Local units span a spectrum from
those, such as school districts, that are functionally specialized to
those, such as municipalities, that are responsible for a wide range
of services. Any method of evaluating the constitutionality of voting
schemes established for these widely variant institutions should recognize that, in some circumstances, the most appropriate representational structure might include unequal districting or restrictions, for'
these would give more influence to those citizens with the greater
interest in the decisions of the local unit.15
In voting cases arising out of local elections, the Court has articulated three tests. Although each test was articulated in the context of a different local problem, all three are concerned with
whether the unit in question has sucli widespread and universally
important effects on the local population that any infringement on
the franchise would be improper.
The earliest method used by the Court was adopted in Avery, a
malapportionment case, where the powers of the unit in question,
the County Commissioners Court, and the unit's impacts on the citizens were examined to determine whether deviations from equal
population districting were permissible. The Court noted that the
Commissioners Court exercised many important powers16 and that
of state government and further suggested that such problems may be more amenable
to political than to judicial solutions. See Martin, The Supreme Court and Local Government Reapportionment: The First Phase, 35 TENN. L. REv. 313,317 (1968)._
14. There are approximately 80,000 different units of local government. Included
arc 3,043 counties, 17,996 municipalities, 17,144 townships, 18,332 special districts, and
25,000 school districts. COI\IMITIEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING LOCAL
GOVERNMENT 67 (1966). For surveys of the various possibilities for the formation, validation, and operation of special districts, see J. Bou.ENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES (1957); R. SMITH, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, SPECIAL DISTRICTS AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT (1964); Hankerson, Special Governmental Districts, 35 TEXAS L. REv. 1004
(1957).
15. Many commentators were critical of the extension in Avery of one person-one
vote to general local governing bodies. See, e.g., Grant &: McArthur, "One Man-One
Vote" and County Government: Rural, Urban and Metropolitan Implications, 36 GEO.
WAsH. L. REv. 760 (1968); Martin, The Supreme Court and Local Government Reapportionment: The Second Phase, 21 BAYLOR L. REv. 5 (1969). These commentators
foresaw that a strict one person-one vote rule could make it difficult to create an institutional framework that could solve regional problems by encouraging the participation
of many differently sized units. The idea that population should not be the sole consideration in such cases was first expressed by Weinstein, Effect of Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1 (1965).
16. The Court concluded:
The Commissioners Court . • . •
"is the general governing body of the county. It establishes a courthouse and jail,
appoints numerous minor officials such as the county health officer, fills vacancies
in the county offices, lets contracts in the name of the county, builds roads and
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its decisions significantly affected every county resident.17 Since the
Commissioners Court had such "general governmental powers," 18
equal population districting was required. The Court issued a caveat
that "[w]ere the Commissioners Court a special-purpose unit of government assigned the performance of functions affecting definable
groups of constituents more than other constituents, we would have
to confront the question whether such a body might be apportioned
in ways which give greater influence to the citizens most affected by
the organization's functions." 19
As in the decisions on state and federal legislative apportionment,
in Avery the Court grounded its requirement of equal population
districting on the postulate that each citizen should have an equal
voice in institutions that affect all citizens equally. In the local case,
however, the Court was more careful in its analysis of the effects of
the governmental unit on the citizens, in order to ensure that the
norm of equal districting was in fact appropriate. 20 The Court recognized that, in local units where the impact on citizens is not uniform, other representational structures may be necessary, although
it left unclear both the parameters of the situation in which a deviation from equal popul,ation districting would be allowed and the
permissible extent of such a deviation. The inquiry into powers and
impacts made in Avery is a suitable method for resolving representational problems at the local level in that it possesses a high degree of
flexibility; the analysis focuses directly on the link between individual need and institutional structure that was the cornerstone of the
state malapportionment decisions.
Even in a case that does not fall within the Avery caveat because
the local unit possesses general governmental powers, some flexibility
may be possible, as indicated by the Court's decision in Abate v.
Mundt. 21 However, the margin allowed by that case is very narrow.
Abate involved malapportionment in the electoral districts of a
county legislative body. Although the Court found that deviations
from population equality required careful scrutiny because of the
bridges, administers the county's public welfare services, performs numerous
duties in regard to elections, sets the county ta..x rate, issues bonds, adopts the
county budget, and serves as a board of equalization of tax assessments."
390 U.S. at 476, quoting VERNON'S ANN. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 18, Interpretive Commen•
tary (1955).
17. 390 U.S. at 484.
18. ~90 U.S. at 484-85.
19. 390 U.S. at 483-84.
20. In Avery the Court analyzed the powers and impacts of the governmental unit
to determine if the unit had "general governmental powers." No such analysis had been
undertaken in the congressional and state legislative districting cases because of the
readily apparent widespread and important impacts present in those cases.
21. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
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importance of voting rights, it tolerated an 11.9 per cent deviation
from strict numerical equality.22 The Court based this result on its
finding that the plan that permitted this deviation would further
cooperation between the county and its constituent towns and on the
long history of that cooperation23-a historical argument that seems
at odds with the Court's observation in the same opinion that flexibility is needed "to meet changing societal needs." 24 The Court also
pointed out that the deviation did not discriminate against any particular group of voters; 25 it thus distinguished Hadley v. Junior
College District,26 an earlier local malapportionment case, where an
apportionment scheme was struck down because it systematically
discriminated against urban voters within a metropolitan district. 27
This distinction would indicate that the room for flexibility left
open in Abate is much smaller than that hinted at by the Avery
caveat, for Abate would not tolerate infringements resulting from
the purposeful allocation of more political influence to a certain geographic area by giving it more heavily weighted votes, even if the
nonuniform impacts standard of Avery were met. Thus, the flexibility of the Avery method, which might allow an exception from
equal population districting where a local unit has a differential impact on various groups of citizens, would derive from the possibility
that the unit would fall outside the parameters of the powers and
impacts test, not from the possibility that purposefully discriminatory deviations could survive careful scrutiny.
The major difficulty with the Avery method stems from its very
flexibility. Precisely because the phrase "general governmental pow-·
ers" is ambiguous, it is difficult to apply, and the method is fraught
with the danger of a misapplication that will not adequately protect
the cons,titutional right to effective representation. The difficulty of
applying the concept of "general governmental powers" to a functionally specialized unit is illustrated by Hadley v. Junior College
District.28 In that case the Court struck down a representational
scheme for the election of trustees of a junior college district.29 Even
I

22. See 403 U.S. at 184.
23. 403 U.S. at 186.
24. 403 U.S. at 185.
25. 403 U.S. at 186.
26. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
27. 403 U.S. at 186. For a description of the apportionment system in Hadley, see
note 29 infra.
28. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
29. Missouri law allowed school districts by referendum to establish a consolidated
junior college district and elect six trustees. The law also provided that the trustees
were to be apportioned among the school districts on the basis of each district's "school
enumeration" (pupils betlveen the ages of 6 and 20). However, the apportionment
scheme systematically discriminated against voters in the more populous districts.
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though the Court admitted that the powers of the trustees were not
so broad as those of the Midland County Commissioners, it found
that their powers were numerous and affected all district citizens in
such a way that equal population districting was required. 30 As in
Avery, the Court reserved the possibility that "there might be some
case in which a State elects certain functionaries whose duties are
so far removed from normal governmental activities and so disproportionately affect different groups that a popular election in compli•
ance with Reynolds . . . might not be required . . . ."31
Although the Hadley Court based its holding on .the Avery doctrine, its language suggests a less flexible test-that the decision to
select officials by popular election is, in itself, sufficient to require
equal population districting.32 An inquiry into the importance to
voters of the roles played by various officials and the purposes of
particular elections was said to be too difficult; 38 the fact that an
official is elected was found to be "a strong enough indication that
the choice is an important one." 34 Unlike Avery, this second, or
"popular election," method has the advantages of simplicity and
ease of application.85 Moreover, there is no danger, in the cases
because whenever a large district's share of the total enumeration fell within a certain
percentage range it was allocated the number of trustees corresponding to the bottom
or the range, while the remaining trustees were elected at-large in the smaller districts.
Thus, Kansas· City had 50 per cent of the trustees but 60 per cent of the school enumeration. 397 U.S. at 56-57.
,

30. The junior college trustees had the power to "levy and collect taxes, issue
bonds ••• , hire and fire teachers, make contracts, collect fees, supervise and discipline
students, pass on petitions to annex school districts, acquire property by condemnation,
and in general manage operations of a junior college." 397 U.S. at 53. The Court said
that "these powers, while not fully as broad as those of the Midland County Commissioners, certainly show that the trustees perform important governmental functions
within the districts, and we think these powers are general enough and have sufficient
impact thr~mghout the district to justify the conclusion that the principle we applied
in Avery should be applied here." 397 U.S. at 53-54.
31. 397 U.S. at 56.
32. See 397 U.S. at 54-55. The "popular election" standard of Hadley was dicta, for
the Court held that the facts fit within the parameters of the Avery doctrine. See note
30 supra.
33. "If the ,purpose of a particular election were to be the determining factor in
whether voters are entitled to equal voting power, courts would be faced with the diffi•
cult job of distinguishing between various elections. We cannot readily perceive judi•
cially manageable standards to aid in such a task." 397 U.S. at 55.
34. 397 U.S. at 55.
35. The simplicity of the "popular election" test is somewhat negated by the failure
of the Court to clarify the parameters of what it regarded as a "popular election." Since
the Hadley case was one involving local malapportionment, the test clearly covers an
election in such a case. A question of importance is whether it would also include a
restricted election and thus encompass the situation presented in Salyer. An argument
against such a reading is that the inference of important impacts on all citizens, which
the Court drew from the use of a popular election in Hadley, could not be drawn from
an electoral scheme in which only some citizens were enfranchised. The Hadley Court
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where there is a popular election, that the test will provide inadequate constitutional protection for the individual citizen. The
disadvantage of this method is that it does not inquire whether every
citizen needs equally effective representation, but merely presumes,
in some cases, that every citizen does. However, there may well be
cases in which a unit's activities are so disproportionately concentrated in one geographic area within its boundaries that it might
be desirable to give the more heavily affected area more political
influence even though an area-wide election is held. Dissenting in
Avery, Justice Fortas noted that the County Commissioners were
primarily concerned with rural affairs, especially rural roads, and
that they did not service roads within the City of Midland.36 Therefore, he was of the opinion that the norm of equal population districting was inappropriate for the Commissioners Court; he stressed
the need for a standard that had the "latitude of prescription" necessary to accommodate "the complexities of local government."37 The
Hadley popular election test has no latitude; it is an overinclusive,
"blanket" test, which does not possess the analytical :flexibility to
draw distinctions among the needs of citizens for representation iii
different local structures with variable impacts.
Under a third test, used by the Court in cases involving voter
restrictions rather than malapportionments in districting, the mere
existence of a restriction subjects the arrangement to strict scrutiny.38
Like the popular-election test, this method sets up a blanket rule:
The former ·test mandates equal population districting whenever
there is a popular election; the latter triggers the application of strict
scrutiny whenever there is a restricted franchise.
The restriction test was used in Kramer v. Union Free School District,39 where the Court applied strict scrutiny to a scheme under
which eligibility to vote in school board elections was restricted to
residents who owned or leased taxable real property in the school
district or who had children in the local schools. Plaintiff was a
childless bachelor who lived with his parents. The Court noted that
said: "[I]n an election open to all, there is no discernible, valid reason why constitutional distinctions should be drawn on the basis of the purpose of the election." 397
U.S. at 54-55 (emphasis added). This suggests that Hadley may be inapplicable to a
restricted election.
36. "[T]he Commissioners Court's functions and powers are quite limited, and they
are defined and restricted so that their primary and preponderant impact is on the
rural areas and residents. The extent of its impact on the city is quite limited." 390
U.S. at 507.
37. "The simplicity of the Court's ruling today does not comport with the lack of
simplicity which characterizes the miscellany which constitutes our local governments."
390 U.S. at 499.
38. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969). For a discussion of the strict scrutiny test, see note 4 supra.
39. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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strict scrutiny of the restrictions was appropriate because "[s]tatutes
granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose
the danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives." 40 The state of
New York claimed that the restrictions limited the franchise to those
"primarily interested" in school affairs and that restrictions were
necessary to ensure an informed electorate. However, the Court
struck do,;vn the restriction; it found that, even if the state could
limit the franchise to those "primarily interested in school affairs,"
the statute did not do so with sufficient precision to satisfy strict
scrutiny.41 The Court pointed out that the statute would give a
vote to a hypothetical unemployed and unconcerned young man
who rented an apartment but paid no ta..'{es and would not allow
the plaintiff, who was in fact very concerned with school affairs and
paid state and federal taxes, to vote. 42
Again, like the popular-election test, the Kramer test's prime virtues are simplicity of application and assured protection for the disenfranchised citizen.43 Its disadvantages are twofold. First, it is a
· rigid test that is difficult to satisfy. Even if the precision requirement
is met, a restriction of the franchise to a specially interested group
will apparently be upheld only if it is necessary to promote a compelling state interest. Moreover, under Avery, the critical decision is
made by focusing on the unit's powers and its impacts on citizens
generally, while the Kramer method, at the strict scrutiny stage,
analyzes and compares the interests of specific individuals. The standard, of precision required by the latter analysis is very high; the
former method, in contrast, can be satisfied by looking at general
conditions, rather than at the situations of particular individuals.44
40. 395 U.S. at 626-27.
41. 395 U.S. at 632.
42. 395 U.S. at 632 n.15.
43. The application of the strict scrutiny test has almost always resulted in the
invalidation of the classification. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. ,330, 363·64 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); note 4 supra. But see Schindler v. Palo Verde Irrigation Dist,,
1 Cal. App. 3d 831, 82 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1969). That case involved an equal protection chal•
lenge to a weighted voting provision in an irrigation district established by special
legislative act. Although the case did not involve a restriction of the franchise, the
court felt bound by Kramer to apply strict scrutiny. The court reasoned that "[a]ny
disparity in the statutory grant of the franchise, whether it be in the quantum of
influence distributed among voters or in the total denial .of franchise to some of its
grant to others, must be subjected to close judicial examination." 1 Cal. App. 3d at 837,
82 Cal. Rptr. at 65. The court, nevertheless, upheld the provision, noting that it was
"necessary" to further the compelling interest of land reclamation because "(a]bsent
the voting qualification provided by the Act, it is doubtful that the District could have
been formed or functioned." 1 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
. 44. For a critical discussion of this aspect of Kramer, see Note, Limitations on the
Franchise and the Standard of Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 1970 UTAH
L. REv. 143. The analysis of Kramer and the other restriction cases stimulated many
articles suggesting that various voting provisions were invalid, See, e.g., Gaines, The
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Second, the Kramer method is overinclusive, as was the Hadley
popular-election test. The application of strict scrutiny to all selective enfranchisements without a preliminary inquiry similar to the
powers-and-impacts analysis of Avery neglects the possibility that,
in some restriction cases, it may not be appropriate to give the disenfranchised citizen political influence in the unit or decision in
question because he is not affected by that unit or decision to the
same degree as are others. For the Court in Kramer, however, the
presumed possibility that the disenfranchised citizen needs representation was sufficient to trigger the application of strict scrutiny.45
The Court may have felt that it was not necessary to make an initial
inquiry into impacts in restriction cases, as it was in mal~pportionment cases such as Avery, because the total denial of the vote-seems a
more grievous violation of the right to effective representation than
does dilution by malapportionment. However, a restriction on the
franchise in an election involving a local government unit the activities of which have varying degrees of impact may be a less serious
violation of the interest in representative government than severe
malapportionment of districts in a general governing unit. In short,
in restriction cases, also, there exists a need for a method that can
accommodate this possibility.
Despite the development of the three different tests, one constant factor in the local government voting cases prior to Salyer was
that the Court struck down any substantial46 franchise infringement,
be it restriction or malapportionment.
The Salyer case involved both a restriction of the franchise to
landowners, and malapportionment in that votes were weighted according to the value of the land mvned by each voter. Salyer did
not, therefore, fit neatly within the parameters of any of the previous
methods. The contested provisions concerned the election of the
general governing body-the board of directors-of a ·w-a.ter storage
Right of Non-Property Owners to Participate i~ a Special Assessment Majority Protest,
20 UCLA L. REv. 201 (1972); Note, Voting Restriction in Special Districts: A Case Study
of the Salt River Project, 1969 I.Aw 8: Soc. ORDER 636; Note, Annexation Elections and
the Right to Vote, 20 UCLA L. REv. 1093 (1973).
45. See 395 U.S. at 626-27.
46. The Court has been willing to tolerate deviation from equality as large as 11.9
per cent, at least in the presence of special circumstances. See Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S.
182 (1971), discussed in text accompanying notes 21•27 supra. The Abate decision stim-

ulated varying responses by the commentators. See, e.g., Note, The Supreme Court, 1970
Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 146-52 (1971) (favorable); Note, Reapportionment-Nine Years
into the "Revolution" and Still Struggling, 70 MICH. L. REv. 586 (1972) (unfavorable).
The recent decision in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), suggests that the 11.9 per
cent deviation allowed in Abate will not be the limit of permissible departures from
equality in local electoral districting. Mahan upheld a 16.4 per cent variation in the
populations of Virginia's state legislative districts. See notes 8-9 supra; text accompanying note 9 supra.
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district.47 The provisions enfranchise only those who own land
within the district and allocate one vote to each owner for every
100 dollars (or part thereof) of assessed valuation of his land. 48 Landowners who live outside the district may vote, while district residents
may not vote unless they own land. 49 Corporate landowners can also
vote. 60 Landholdings vary immensely in size, and, at the time of the
suit, four corporations owned eighty-five per cent of the total assessed value of the district.61
The directors' main function is to plan and supervise projects for
the storage and distribution of water for irrigation,62 although they
also have powers with regard to drainage, flood control, and the
generation of hydroelectric energy. 63 After a project plan has been
dra-wn up by the directors and approved by the state,64 it is submitted
to district landowners for approval. At this election, which, like the
election of the board, is restricted to landowners, the project must
receive not only a majority of the assessed value votes, but also the
approval of a majority of the landowners. 60 In order to finance a
project, an impartial board of commissioners assesses each separately
owned tract according to the benefits that it is to receive from the
project.66
The Supreme Court upheld both the voting restriction and the
weighting provisions in the enabling legislation. As the first step in
its analysis, the Court assessed the functions and effects of the water
storage district. It concluded that the case fell within the exception
delineated in Avery and Hadley for elections of officials "'whose
47. The statutory provisions applicable to such water storage distl'icts arc CAL,
WATER CODE§§ 39000-48401 (West 1966), as amended (West. Supp. 1974).
48. CAL. WATER CoDE § 41000 (West 1966) provides: "Only the holders of title to land
are entitled to vote at a general election." CAL. WATER CODE § 41001 (West 1966) provides: "Each voter may vote in each precinct in which any of the land owned by him
is situated and may cast one vote for each one hundred dollars (SlO0), or fraction
thereof, worth of land, exclusive of improvements, minerals and mineral rights therein,
in the precinct."
49. In fact, only a few of the 307 district landowners reside within the district, and
most of the 77 district residents own no land themselves and are employees of the large
corporate landowners. Brief for Appellee at 22-25, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
50. CAL. WATER CODE§ 41004 (West 1966), allows "[a]ny corporation holding title to
land within the district ••• to vote through any officer or agent ••• of the corporation."
51. 410 U.S. at 735. One corporate landowner, J.G. Boswell Co., owned land com•
prising more than half of the assessed value in the district. 410 U.S. at 735.
52. Water storage districts are formed for the limited purpose of storing and dis•
tributing water for irrigation. CAL. WATER CODE § 43000 (West 1966).
53. See CAL. WATER CoDE § 42200 (West Supp. 1974).
54. The State Treasurer is empowered to investigate proposed projects. See CAL,
WATER CODE§§ 42275, 42300-01, 42500 (West Supp. 1974).
55. CAL. WATER CODE§ 42550 (West 1966).
56. CAL. WATER CoDE § 46176 (\\Test 1966),
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duties are
far- removed from normal governmental activities
and . . . disproportionately affect different groups.' " 67 In support of
this conclusion, the Court noted that the district has a limited, functionally specialized purpose-providing water for irrigation-and
does not provide "general public services." 58 The Court also emphasized that district activities disproportionately affect one group of
citizens-the district landowners, who pay the costs and charges of
the projects.50 Because the case fell within the Hadley exception, the
elections were not subjected to "the popular election requirements"
that were imposed in preceding cases.00 Essentially, this meant that
the provisions were not subjected to strict scrutiny.
Instead, the Court, in the second step of its analysis, considered
whether the provisions were " 'wholly irrelevant to achievement of
the regulation's objectives.' " 61 It concluded that there. was a rational basis for the statute's exclusion of nonlandowners, for its exclusions of lessees, and for its weighted voting scheme. 62
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Marshall and Br~nnan, dissented. The dissent criticized the majority's refusal to subject the
voting provisions to strict scrutiny. Justice Douglas said that strict
scrutiny was required solely because some residents were ·excluded
from the franchise. 63 Moreover, the dissent concluded that, were
strict scrutiny applied, the restriction of the franchise to landowners
could not be upheld because landowners as a class are not affected by
district activities to such a greater degree than are nonlandowners
that the owners alone should have the vote. 64 The dissent 1vould also
have invalidated the weighted voting provision; it asserted that
"when it comes to the performance of governmental functions all
enter the polls on an equal basis.'' 65 Justice Douglas criticized the
majority's finding that the unit fell within the Hadley exception.
He noted that the "Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District surely
performs 'important governmental functions' which 'have sufficient
57. 410 U.S. at 727-28, quoting Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970).
58. 410 U.S. at 728-29.
59. 410 U.S. at 729.
60. 410 U.S. at 730.
61. 410 U.S. at 730, quoting Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commrs., 330 U.S.
552, 556 (1947).
.
62. 410 U.S. at 734-35.
63. The basis for the minority's choice of test was that "[p]rovisions authorizing a
selective franchise are disfavored, because they 'always pose the danger of denying some
citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their
lives.'" 410 U.S. at 736, quoting Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627
(1969).
64. "[I]rrigation, water storage, the building of levees, and Hood control, implicate
the entire community. All residents of the district must be granted the franchise." 410
U.S. at 738.
65. 410 U.S. at 739.
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impact throughout the district.' " 66 In addition, he strongly criticized
the enfranchisement of the corporate landowners. 67
The test developed by the majority in Salyer is more flexible
than the dissent thought permissible, given the requirements of the
, Constitution. It consists of two stages. First, the Court looks to the
general or special purpose of the local unit and the uniformity or
disparity of its effects on different constituent groups. I£ the duties
of the unit are "far removed from normal governmental activities" 68
and there is a disproportionate effect, the Court proceeds to a second
stage, at which it asks whether there is a rational basis for the voting
infringements. By implication, if the duties of the unit are more
normal or the 'impact is not disproportionate, infringements on the
franchise are subjected to strict scrutiny to determine if they are
justified by a compelling state interest. Infringements that fail to
pass the second-stage tests violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. Although Salyer involved a restriction, as well as
a weighted voting scheme, the first stage of the method used in
Salyer is a direct outgrowth of the powers-and-effects analysis used
by the Court in Avery, a malapportionment case. The language used
in Salyer is the converse of that used in Avery: While Avery asked
whether the unit had "general governmental powers" 69 and a "broad
range of impacts on all citizens," 70 the Salyer Court asked if the
elected officials exercised duties that are "far removed from normal
governmental activities" 71 and "disproportionately affect different
groups.'' 72
Like Avery, Salyer does not propose a blanket test. Rather, it
attempts to define those cases in which a structure in accord with
one person-one vote and the unrestricted franchise is not the most
appropriate solution to the representational problem. Again like the
test applied in Avery to a malapportionment case, this method fo.
cuses on the nature of the individual-institutional link by inquir66. 410 U.S. at 740.
67. It is indeed grotesque to think of corporations voting within the framework of
political representation of people. Corporations were held to be "persons" for purposes both of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendinent and of the
Equal Protection Clause. Yet, it is unthinkable in terms of the American tradition that corporations should be admitted to the franchise. Could a State allot voting rights to its corporations, weighting each vote according to the wealth of the
corporation? Or could it follow the rule of one corporation, one vote?
It would be a radical and revolutionary step to take, as it would change our
whole concept of the franchise.
410 U.S. at 741-42.
68. 410 U.S. at 727-29.
69. 390 U.S. at 485.
70. 390 U.S. at 483.
71. 410 U.S. at 727-29.
72. 410 U.S. at 729.
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ing whether all citizens are affected in ways that are sufficiently uniform that each citizen should have equal representation. In extending this approach to Salyer, which also involved a restriction, the
Court relaxed the prior rigid approach73 it had taken in restriction
cases.
Although the Salyer method attempts to be selective in the application of the strict scrutiny test and has a valuable flexibility, it
also has serious flaws. Specifically, its first-stage analysis does not,
either in its formulation or in its application, accurately detect when
the interest in effective representation is significantly impaired. In
particular, the inquiry at this stage into the powers possessed by the
unit lacks predictive value and asks a question that is basically irrelevant to the need of potential voters for representation. The question asked by the Court was whether the duties of the unit or official
in question are "far removed from normal governmental activities." 74
The Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District met this test because
it does not provide "general public services such as schools, housing,
transportation, utilities, roads or anything else ordinarily financed by
a municipal body." 75 To fulfill this element, then, the primary requirement seems to be that the unit in question be functionally
specialized or unusual, but whether a unit provides an unusual or
73. This shift away from a rigid approach to problems involving voter restrictions
parallels the Court's action in another equal protection case decided in the same term
-San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Rodriguez
involved a claimed right to equal treatment in educational financing. Like Salyer,
Rodriguez seemed concerned with the readiness of the Court in other equal protection
cases to apply strict scrutiny without first examining the appropriateness of such a
rigorous standard. Rodriguez was brought on behalf of poor and minority children who
lived in school districts with low property tax bases. The appellees claimed that these
children as a class were discriminated against by the state's system of school financing,
which allowed substantial interdistrict disparities "largely attributable to differences in
the amounts of money collected through local property taxation." 411 U.S. at 16. The
Court had previously said that classifications based on wealth have been "traditionally
disfavored." Harper v. Virginia Bd.·of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). The district
court, relying on this suggestion, found the classification in Rodriguez to be suspec~ and
thus subject to strict scrutiny. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337
F. Supp. 280, 283 r,.v .D. Tex. 1971). However, the Supreme Court refused to apply strict
scrutiny and urged that a less facile analysis than that employed by the district court be
used:
Rather than focusing on the unique features of the alleged discrimination, the
courts in these cases [lower court decisions involving school financing laws] have
virtually assumed their findings of a suspect classification through a simplistic process of analysis . • . • Before a State's laws and .the justifications they create are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, we· think these threshold considerations must be
analyzed more closely.
411 U.S. at 19. The "threshold" questions in Rodriguez included "whether it makes a
difference for purposes of consideration under the Constitution that the class of disadvantaged 'poor' cannot be identified or defined in customary equal protection terms, and
whether the relative-rather than absolute-nature of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence." 411 U.S. at 19.
74. 410 U.S. at 727-28, quoting Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970).
75. 410 U.S. at 728-29.
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specialized service should not be determinative in an evaluation of
the constitutionality of the related voting scheme. The critical question is, rather, whether the impact on the citizens is so uniform that
each citizen should participate equally in political decision-making.
The "far removed" test does eliminate from closer consideration infringements in elections for units with a broad (but indeterminate)
range of functions that fall under the rubric of "general public
services" and thus affect every citizen in important ways. However,
this selection can be made more effectively by looking directly at
the effect of the functions, as the second, or "disproportionate effects," element of the first stage of the Salyer test does. Moreover,
the close association of the "far removed" test with the "dispropor•
tionate effects" test in the language of the Court may encourage a
tendency to presume that, if a unit does engage in activities not normally provided by a governmental unit, its impact will be disproportionate. This tendency is indicated by the Court's failure clearly to
describe its inquiry as looking first to powers and then to effects.
Instead, in Salyer, as in Avery and Hadley, the Court, describing
the general rule and its exception, posed the choice as between a
unit. with specialized powers and disproportionate effects and a unit
with general powers and equalized effects and ignored the possibility
of a unit ·with specialized powers but equalized effects. This may lead
the Court, when it considers the effects element, to seize upon any
disproportionate effects that exist and to downplay more generalized
public interests, such as that of flood control in Salyer. 16
That a specialized function can have a significant general importance and may even be fairly usual within a given part of the
country is also illustrated by Salyer. Justice Rehnquist found that
the water storage district performed a service. that was "far removed
from normal governmental functions." But, in the Western states,
including California, the supply of water for irrigation is essential
to local economies, and governmental units that perform this function have proliferated.77 In an agricultural area such as that in which
the Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District is located, a water
storage district may be one of the most important local governmental units in terms of budget and service to the residents. The
"far removed" test as applied here ignores the context in which the
unit in question operates.
The analysis of the second element of the first stage in Salyer is
similarly superficial. This element properly focuses on the effects of
the unit on the citizenry. However, as phrased and applied, it only
76. Compare 410 U.S. at 728-~9.n.8 with 410 U.S. at 737-38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
77. J. BAIN, R. CAVES & J. MARGOLIS, THE WATER INDUSTRY OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
(1969). Justice Rehnquist does seem to acknowledge the essential nature of water pro•
grams in the Western states. See 410 U.S. at 721-23.
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detects any disparity in the importance and intensity of the effects
on one group as compared to another. The Court did not examine
the interests of the disenfranchised voters independently,. but only
by comparison with the interests of the landowners. It would seem
that, regardless of the disparity of interest levels between two
groups, any group that is interested in the unit in a1;1 important
way should not be denied representation. Although it would, in
essence, require the Court to articulate an absolute minimum standard by which to measure the interests of different groups, such a
method would provide a more sensitive mechanism to detect significant impairments of the right to representation. 78
Moreover, the Court in Salyer took a narrow and shallow view
of the interests to be considered in analyzing the relative effects of
the water storage district on various citizen groups. The question
of whether a group is "disproportionately affected," as the Court
phrased it in Salyer, is very similar to the question that the Court
considered in an earlier case involving a voting restriction in a local
election. In Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,79 the Court framed the question as whether the difference in interests between the enfranchised
and disenfranchised citizens was "sufficiently substantial to justify
excluding the latter from the franchise." 80 Applying strict scrutiny
in accordance with the· Kramer approach to restriction cases, the
Court held invalid legislation that limited the franchise to property
owners in a referendum to authorize the issuance of general obligation bonds to finance the improvement o~ municipal services. Although the question asked by the Court was essentially the same as
that asked by the "effects" element of Salyer, the Court in Phoenix
gave weight to certain interests that the Salyer Court belittled. For
example, one reason the Court gave for its conclusion in Phoenix
was that, although the debt would be serviced in part by real property taxes, a significant part of the ultimate burden of the property
78. It could be argued that, in restriction cases, the Court had decided that, when a
citizen has some basic level of interest in the functions of a governmental unit, he can•
not be denied representation even though others have substantially greater interests. In
City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970), the Court said: "Presumptively,
when all citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental decision subject to
a referendum, the Constitution does not permit weighted voting or the exclusion of
otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise." 399 U.S. at 209. However, the holdings
in restriction cases such as Phoenix centered on the challenged statutes' lack of precision
in distinguishing those who were "primarily interested" from those who were not. See,
e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704-06 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969). The Court's findings that the statutes lacked pre•
cision cannot be readily viewed as establishing that when a citizen's stake in a unit rises
to a threshold level he cannot be denied representation in the unit. The Court in the
restriction cases, as in Salyer, still seems concerned with disparities, rather than with
absolute levels. See also text accompanying note 80 supra.
79. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
80. 399 U.S. at 209.
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tax would be passed on to lessees, so that any increase in property
taxes due to bond assessments would be reflected by somewhat
higher rents. 81 The Court also mentioned that property taxes on
businesses would be passed on as a cost of doing business to all residents (not just property owners) who buy products or services produced in the city. 82
In contrast, the Salyer Court, in concluding that district landmmers were "disproportionately affected" by district activities,
stressed that they bore the project costs in the first instance. 83 While
this is accurate, it does not trace the transfer of a part of the burden
to lessees, an important part of the strict scrutiny analysis in Phoenix.
The Court in Salyer refused to consider seriously one of the arguments that the Court had found convincing in Phoenix:
No doubt residents ·within the District may be affected by its activities. But this argument proves too much. Since assessments imposed
by the district become a cost of doing business for those who farm
within it, and that cost must ultimately be passed on to the consumers of the produce, food shoppers in far away metropolitan areas
are to some extent likewise "affected" by the activities of the district.
Constitutional adjudication cannot rest on any such "house that Jack
built" foundation . . . ,84

While this argument may indicate that Phoenix went too far in
tracing the economic burden, it is equally inappropriate to focus on
tlie initial incidence of costs and completely disregard easily discernible secondary economic impacts. 86
The Salyer analysis is also superficial in that it focuses on specific
economic effects and fails to consider other important interests that
may be affected by the activities of the local unit. First, Salyer ignores more diffuse effects. In Phoenix the Court struck down the
81. The proportion of property tax that a lessee bears is determined by the demand
for rental property. If demand is very high, a higher proportion of the tax can be passed
on. 399 U.S. at 210 n.6, 211 n.8. See also D. NETZER, EcoNOl\lICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX
32-40 (1966).
82. 399 U.S. at 211.
83. 410 U.S. at 729.
84. 410 U.S. at 730-31.
85. The Phoenix Court may have selectively emphasized those factors that supported
the result it desired to reach. For example, the Court discounted one economic burden
that would have supported the franchise restriction; although the bond assessments
could become liens on the landowner's property if not paid, the Court refused to take
this into account because there was no demonstrated possibility of foreclosure. 399 U.S.
at 212. Of course, assessments in water storage districts become liens on the land, See
CAL. WATER ConE § 46280 (West 1966). The Salyer Court attached considerable importance to these liens: "The California Legislature could quite reasonably have concluded that the number of landowners and owners of sufficient amounts of acreage
whose consent was necessary to organize the district would not have subjected their land
to the lien of its possibly very substantial assessments unless they had a dominant voice
in its control." 410 U.S. at 731.
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restriction to landowners in part because all residents were affected
by the quality of municipal services. 86 The Kramer appellant's interest in school board activities was not explicitly defined by the
Court, but the Court did mention that he was "affected by school
board decisions" ;87 since the appellant had no children in school
and did not pay property taxes, this effect must have been more
indirect-perhaps in the sense that all citizens have an interest in
the existence of a good school system and a well-educated citizenry.
While it is true that the primary services of the water storage district before the Court in Salyer directly benefit only landowners,
district activities also have impacts of a more diffuse nature. Flood
control activities affect every district resident, and all district projects have a general effect on the local economy. Yet, these more. generalized impacts were not given any weight.
Second, the Salyer Court ignored noneconomic effects, such as
the subjective element of personal interest in the unit's activities.
Again, in Kramer the Court considered this to be an important consideration.88 Although the appellant in that case apparently just
asserted that he was interested in local school affairs,89 the Court
seems to have considered this interest weighty enough to offset the
fact that he did not bear any tangible economic burden in the
form of school-related taxes. 90
This analysis of the first stage of the Salyer method reveals that,
while that stage has the flexibility needed to evaluate mechanisms
designed to resolve representational problems in local government,
as applied in Salyer it does not focus sufficiently on the critical question of impact on the citizenry. Since the outcome of this stage may
be determinative of the entire case,91 the Court should make a more
careful and considered analysis. The superficial application of the
test in Salyer has been shown to have left a large margin for error.
Because the water storage district was found to fit both elements
of the first stage, the Court did not subject the justifications for
franchise infringements to strict scrutiny at the second stage, but
86. 399 U.S. at 209.
87. 395 U.S. at 632 n.15.
88. 395 U.S. at 632 n.15. It has been suggested that the Kramer personal-concern
analysis would render invalid any franchise restriction. See Note, Equal Protection
Standards and Franchise Restrictions, 83 HARv. L. REv. 77, 77-86 (1969).
89. 395 U.S. at 640-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
90. 395 U.S. at 632 & n.15. It seems clear that, since the hypothetical; unemployed
young man mentioned by the Court rented an apartment, he paid a "passed-on" property tax, while the appellant bore no such financial burden. Yet, the Kramer Court
characterized the hypothesized man's interest as "remote and indirect" and the appellant's as "primary and direct." The subjective element seems to be the difference
that accounts for this treatment.
91. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); note
4 supra.
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rather applied the less rigorous reasonableness test. Under this analysis the Court is solicitous of the state's justifications and thus gives
the state the flexibility. that the Court has, in some cases, properly
recognized might be needed to deal with local problems. 92
Close analysis indicates that the justifications accepted under
this standard of review were somewhat weak. Some of the problems
considered cursorily at this stage should have been weighed more
carefully in the first-stage analysis. Others, particularly those in regard to which the Court neglects to consider the existence of less
onerous methods of solving the local unit's problems, reflect the
deliberate choice in favor of local flexibility made by the Court in
reaching its conclusion at the first stage. The Court's second-stage
examination of the water district voting scheme in terms of the
rational basis test will be considered at some length. This is not to
say that there were no rational bases to be found for the voting pro•
visions before the Court in Salyer. But a close look at the Court's
reasoning demonstrates the extensive freedom that the Court left
to state decision-makers.
The Court decided that the state could properly exclude all nonlandowners from the franchise because landowners bear the entire
burden of the district's costs in the first instance.93 This is a reiteration of the point made by the Court in its first-stage analysis of the
unit's effects, and it contains the same flaw of focusing only on the
initial incidence of direct economic costs.94
The three justifications96 accepted by the Court in upholding as
rationally based the exclusion of lessees from the franchise 00 are even
less persuasive. First, the Court expressed a fear that the enfranchisement of lessees would allow large landowners to gain more votes by
92. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968): "This Court is
aware of the immense pressures facing units of local government, and of greatly varying
problems with which they must deal. The Constitution does not require that a uniform
straightjacket bind citizens in devising mechanisms of local government suitable for local
needs and efficient in solving local problems." Similarly, the Court noted, in Sailors v.
Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1967): "Viable local governments may need
many innovations, numerous combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in
municipal arrangements to meet changing urban conditions. We see nothing in the
Constitution to prevent experimentation."
93. 410 U.S. at 731.
94. See text accompanying notes 79-85 supra.
95. In addition to these justifications the Court noted that lessees could protect them•
selves politically by negotiating voting rights in their leases, thus mitigating the effect
of the statutory exclusion of lessees. 410 U.S. at 733. In the Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District, large landowners lease the tracts of small landowners and vote these
tracts as proxies. Brief for Appellee at 9, Salyer v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
96. 410 U.S. at 731-33. The Court admitted that "[l]essees undoubtedly do have an
interest in the activities of appellee district analogous to that of landowners in many
respects." 410 U.S. at 732. Aside from the fact that district assessments are passed on to
lessees, see 410 U.S. at 731-32, lessees also are users of district services. 410 U.S. at 731.
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leasing small parcels to loyal employees.97 Since this problem would
not arise under a weighted voting scheme where the land's allocation
can only be voted once, the Court apparently assumed another
means of allocating the vote, such as a per capita method. Even then~
this potential abuse could easily be prevented by a statutory provision requiring lessees actually to farm the land if they are to be allowed to vote. Second, the Court noted that the state might have felt
that landowners would be unwilling to support water storage districts if short-term lessees with less embedded interests in the area
were given a strong voice in district affairs. 98 If the goal that the
Court had in mind was only the successful formation of water storage districts, rather than the formation of water storage districts that
have the wholehearted support of landowners, this fear seems unfounded. The state might have created a statutory scheme that allocated votes in formation elections on a per capita basis, so that districts could be formed by a majority of residents, even without the
votes of the landmvners. If the Court was concerned, rather, ·with the
possibility that a lack of landowner support could prevent the passage by the state legislature of any water storage district enabling legislation that would enfranchise lessees, it might be argued in response that, if the Court were to require that lessees be allowed to
participate, landowners would probably support such legis,lation
rather than do without water storage districts entirely. Finally, the
Court noted that the inclusion of lessees would present an administrative problem, because voting lists are prepared from assessment
rolls, which do not record leases, as well as from state and federal
land lists.99 A voter registration procedure would avoid this difficulty.
The Court's handling of the weighted voting provision deserves
considerable attention. It is the part of the holding that most aroused
the ire of the dissent,100 and it best demonstrates the complex problems that arise in establishing local units that serve special purposes.
The Court found that there was a rational basis for the weighted
voting provision because " 'the benefits and burdens to each landmvner . . . are in proportion to the assessed value of the land.' " 101
97. 410 U.S. at 732.
98. 410 U.S. at 732.
99. 410 U.S. at 732-33.
100. See 410 U.S. at 741-42.
101. 410 U.S. at 734, quoting Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 342 F. Supp. 144, 146 (E.D. Cal. 1972). The issue of weighted voting has arisen in
a variety of contexts in other California litigation. See, e.g., County of Riverside v.
Whitlock, 22 Cal. App. 3d 863, 99 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1972) (upholding weighted voting in
a municipal improvement "majority protest" scheme); Schindler v. Palo Verde Irrigation
Dist., 1 Cal. App. 3d 831, 82 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1969) (upholding weighted voting system of
irrigation district). Contra, Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal. 3d 942, 501 P .2d 537,
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This justification, although reasonable, glosses over several difficult
issues.
The weighted voting scheme in Salyer is a mechanism for distributing influence and making decisions that can be analogized to
the corporate form, which allocates votes on a per share, rather than
per capita, basis. In both cases, the influence allocated to a person
is linked to the economic contribution that he has made to the
entity. That contribution takes the form of assessments in the water
storage district and of the purchase of shares in the corporation. The
economic benefit that a person receives is also in proportion to his
contribution; more returns in the form of dividends accrue to those
with more shares in a corporation, while more water services are provided to those with more acres (and thus larger assessments) in the
water storage district. Moreover, in both the water storage district
and the corporation, the decision-making apparatus allocates little
or no direct influence to certain interests affected by the unit. In a
corporation, for example, consumers and employees usually have no
direct representation; similarly, the water storage district legislation
in Salyer denies any voice to nonlandowners.
Considerations of fairness and economic efficiency underlie the
weighted voting structures of both the corporation and the water
storage district. Economic theory demands that the owners (or share◄
holders) of a corporation make the corporate decisions. 102 The owners bear the losses and reap the benefits produced by the firm. Motivated by the self-interest of maximizing their individual economic
gains, the O"wners can thus be trusted to seek to maximize firm
profits. It is equitable that, among the owners, influence in management decisions be apportioned according to the losses and profits that
will result to each owner as a consequence of those decisions.
The water storage district, like the corporation, is engaged in the
production of an economic good or service. However, the district
differs from the corporation in that the landmvners, who support the
district by paying assessments and user charges and are thus analogous to shareholders, are also consumers of the district's services, a
position not nec1ssarily occupied by corporate shareholders. The district is a "user cooperative," the dominant economic purpose of
104 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1972) (striking down weighted voting protest provision in city formation proceedings); Burrey v. Embarcadero Municipal Improvement Dist,, 5 Cal. lid
671, 488 P.2d 395, 97 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1971) (striking down weighted voting in an improvement district created by special legislative act).
102. See Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers and Corporate Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248, 250 (1969). As Professor Hetherington points
out, however, the entrepreneurial function is now performed by management rather
than by the shareholders. Id. at 251-55. See also Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decision-Making, 57 CAI.IF. L. REY, 1
(1969).
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which is not the maximization of its profits but the maximization of
the economic welfare of the individual members through the provision of district services at the lowest possible cost per unit output.
Thus, because, like shareholders, district landowners feel the direct
effects, good or ill, of district decisions, provision of the district's
services at the lowest per unit cost ·will presumably be best ensured
if they make the dec,isions. Similarly, it is only fair that those who
stand to gain the most from the efficiency of the district in providing
services should have the commensurately greater influence provided
by a weighted voting scheme.10a
Perhaps these considerations underlay the Court's emphasis on
the economic nexus. Some of the arguments that may justify corporate representation schemes seem to appear in altered form in the
Salyer decision to support weighted voting. Allocation of votes according to investment in the corporation should theoretically be an
incentive for large investments in a corporation's securities, for the
large investor is assured that, although his risk increases with the
amount of his investment, his influence over corporate policy, and
his possible gains from corporate profits, rise commensurately.104 A
similar argument is one possible justification for the weighted voting
scheme in Salyer. The Court noted that the exclusion of lessees could
have been motivated by a need to assure landowners that they would
have a dominant influence, in order to gain their support for the
formation of the water storage district.105 Weighted voting could
similarly be justified as an inducement to large landowners, without
whose support districts would be unlikely to be able to function effectively.106
However, there is an element of coercion in the formation of
water storage districts that is not present in the purchase of corporate stock, for the district is a governmental unit and a landowner
can be made a member of the district and subjected to its assessments
even if he does not vote for district formation or voluntarily join
after the election.107 There are safeguards for involuntary partici103. For an elaboration of the theory of user cooperatives, see

J. MARGOLIS, supra note 77 at 276-84.

J.

BAIN, R. CAVES &

104. This argument is somewhat weakened by the extent to which most corporate
decisions are made by management rather than shareholders. See Eisenberg, supra note
102.
105. 410 U.S. at 732.
106. See Schindler v. Palo Verde Irrigation Dist., 1 Cal. App. 3d 831, 82 Cal. Rptr.
61 (1969), discussed in note 43 supra. The court relied on a similar argument in upholding a weighted voting scheme under the strict scrutiny test.
107. Water storage districts can be initiated by a petition of the owners of a majority
in land value of the land in the proposed district or of 500 landowners with title to at
least 10 per cent of the land in the proposed district. CAL. WATER Coni;: § 39400 (West
1966). This petition, which must set forth details of the district proposal, is submitted
to the California Department of Water Resources, which must make an order deter-
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pants. A landowner is entitled to a hearing regarding the assessment
against his land in order to assure that it is in proportion to the
benefit that his land will receive from a project.108 Individual proj•
ects require the approval of a majority of both the individual landowners' votes and the assessed value votes. 109 Moreover, the power of
the State Treasurer to investigate proposed projects110 may provide
some protection against abuse by the majority. However, no provision allows minority lando·wners to influence directly the types of
projects considered by the board of directors. In short, the small
landowner will always be in a defensive position.
Weighted voting does enable strong private economic interests
to use public authority to increase their resources and power.111
Where large landholding corporations exist, they can use the resources and tax base of the entire water storage district to build
projects that, while possibly of some benefit to the small landowners, particularly benefit the larger landowners. The dissent
pointed out that the convergence of private interests and public
authority in the Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District had, on
occasion, assumed serious dimensions. For instance, in 1969, the district board refused to activate the flood control machinery because
to have done so would have flooded the nearby agricultural lands
held by the dominant landowner, the J. G. Boswell Co. 112 In most
cases, weighted voting will not give small landholders any representation at all. Representation in proportion to their small interest
will not occur, for the directors will serve as representatives of the
large landholders that elected them. Although small landowners can
get some effective representation in areas where they hold the balance of power between competing and equally balanced landholders, one large corporation will often be dominant, as in Salyer, or
the large landowners will have a solid community of interest, which
will leave no balance-of-power role for small landowners.118
mining the practicability, feasibility, and utility of the project. CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 39775-800 (West 1966). The issue of formation is then submitted to the qualified voters,
CAL. WATER CODE § 39927 (West 1966), provides that the provisions applicable to the
general elections for the board of directors (section 41000, which restricts the franchise
to landowners, and section 41001, which provides for weighted voting) arc applicable
to the formation election "as nearly as practicable." See generally note 48 supra.
108. CAL. WATER CODE§ 46225 (West Supp. 1974).
109. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
110. See note 54 supra.
111. For an interesting study of how private economic interests used California
special district enabling legislation to finance improvements to real estate development
projects, see Willoughby, The Quiet Alliance, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 72 (1965). See also
Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co., 70 Cal. 2d 627,451 P.2d 406, 75 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1969).
112. 410 U.S. at 737.
113. The California statute provides that water storage districts arc to be divided
into divisions, "so as to segregate into separate divisions lands possessing the same gen•
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Although weighted voting creates the clear possibility of the misuse of public power by private economic interests, it would not seem
to be constitutionally invalid on the ground that it distributes voting
rights on the basis of wealth, as appellants argued in the Salyer
case.114 The Supreme Court has, in several cases, viewed the use of
wealth-related classifications unfavorably.115 However, its refusal to
accept appellants' argument was not unfounded. First, although votes
in the water district are distributed on the basis of landholding, there
is not a necessary correlation between the wealth of each district
landowner and the amount of land he owns. Second, at least in theory,
the weighted voting provision does not totally deny any landowner,
no matter how poor, a voice in district affairs. In Rodriguez the
Court found that there was no unconstitutional discrimination on
the basis of wealth against students who live in less wealthy school
districts, because they were not totally denied an education.116
Measuring a voter's interest purely in terms of his economic stake
neglects any subjective personal interests that the voter might have.
The courts have not been oblivious to these claims. The Supreme
Court affirmed a district court decision striking down a Louisiana
statutory scheme that allowed only property owners to vote in bond
authorization elections and allocated votes in proportion to the
value of each voter's land. The district court noted that "there is
no necessary correlation between the amount of an assessment and
the degree of interest a taxpayer may have in a particular bond
issue. A ten thousand dollar house to one person may mean more
than a hundred thousand dollar house to another."117
The analysis by the Salyer Court under the rational relationship
test suffered from the same focus on economic matters that characterized the analysis under the effects element of the first stage,118 'and
some of the justifications accepted by the Court were less than strong.
When the Court concluded, under the first stage, that the Tulare
era! character of water rights or interests in the water of a common source." CAL.
39777 (West 1966). No directors are elected by the district at-large; rather,
one director is elected by each division to represent that division. CAL. WATER CODE
§ 39929 (\Vest 1966). Small landowners could be represented if they were concentrated
in one division and could control the election of that division's director.
WATER CODE§

114. 410 U.S. at 733-34.
115. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1970). See also McDonald
v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1966): "[C]areful examination on our
part is especially warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race, . • .
two factors which would independently render a classification highly suspect . . . ."
Harper also involved the fundamental interest in voting, so that the decision did not
rest on the wealth classification alone.
116. 411 U.S. at 29-39.
117. Stewart v. Parish School Bd., 310 F. Supp. 1172, 1179 (E.D. La.), afjd. per curiam,
400 U.S. 884 (1970).
US. See text accompanying notes 88-90 supra.
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Lake Basin Water Storage District should be evaluated under the
rational relationship test, it had finished the most rigorous part of
its analysis. The state was then given not indefinite, but certainly
wide, discretion in its choice of representational structures. Strict
scrutiny would have, for instance, allowed the consideration of possible alternative organizational schemes that would give more protection to the interests of small landowners.119 Possible alternatives
include the appointment, rather than the election, of directors; 120
in that case the board may not as inevitably represent large landed
interests. Another alternative would be to give every landowner one
vote, as is done in California irrigation districts. 121 However, a relatively superficial analysis of alternative means is a cost of the flexibility that is left to the state through the adoption of the rational
relationship approach. Other problems ignored by the Court-such
as the protection of the landless and the small landowner, and the
importance of noneconomic interests-were not sufficiently considered at the first-stage analysis of the unit's effect on the local
citizenry. Their reappearance at the second stage again suggests that
the earlier analysis was not made with sufficient care.
The Court's analysis at the first stage could be seen as a means of
detecting whether the constitutional right to representation has been
appreciably infringed, or-as Salyer may also be interpretedwhether the complainant has any constitutional right to representation in the particular circumstances. If the infringement is relatively
insubstantial or the right does not exist under the circumstances, the
state is free to form its institutions in the way that it finds most
suitable.122
119. When classifications abridging fundamental interests are subjected to strict
scrutiny, the Court typically inquires into alternative methods of achieving the state's
interests. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 351-52 (1972); Shapiro v. Thomp•
son, 394 U.S. 618, 636-38 (1969). Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 451·52 (1973). Sec
also Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 4, at 1122.
120. If an official is appointed, the equal protection standards required for elections
are inapplicable. See Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967), discussed in note
13 supra.
121. CAL. WATER CODE § 21557 (West 1956). In addition to water storage districts,
both California water districts, CAL. WATER CODE § 35003 (West Supp. 1974), and recla•
mation districts, CAL. WATER CODE§ 50704 (West 1966), have voting schemes weighted
according to land value.
122. This type of analysis is illustrated by Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308
F. Supp. 1397 (D. Colo.), affd. mem., 399 U.S. 901 (1970). Plaintiffs challenged a provision of Colorado's annexation statute that permitted municipalities unilaterally to annex
areas that have at least two thirds of their perimeter contiguous with the municipality.
Plaintiffs alleged that the denial to the residents of those areas of the right to vote on
the annexation was a denial of equal protection, since annexation of areas that were
less than two-thirds contiguous with a municipality required the approval of the residents of the area to be annexed. The court rejected the assertion that the prior voting
cases required application of strict scrutiny: "[I]t does not appear that the plaintiffs'
rights are of the kind that have been upheld by the Supreme Court. The factor present
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However, the Salyer decision can also be read as a positive affirmation of the state's ability to design the most appropriate organs
of local government. In dicta in earlier cases the Court has been
solicitous of institutional experimentation at the local level. 123 The
importance of the need for experimentation is difficult to weigh
against the possible harms to disenfranchised individuals in cases
like Salyer because the need is intangible, but the growing chorus
of pleas for relief from the doctrine of one person-one vote 24 indicates its reality.
Indeed, it might be suggested that the first-stage analysis developed in Salyer can be used not only to select those situations in
which the constitutionally protected right of certain groups to representation is relatively insignificant or nonexistent, but also to
select those situations in which the state should be allowed to design
suitable representational institutions because local flexibility is very
important. Salyer presents as clear a situation as is likely to arise in
which a substantial departure from one person-one vote is justifiable. However, it can be expected and hoped that the Court will
further refine its application of the first analytic stage so that those
interests that were neglected or slighted in Salyer receive more careful attention.

in the cited cases which appears to have been crucial is that the franchise was granted
to one group of persons to the detriment of another group." 308 F. Supp. at 1403. The
court upheld the provision under the rational relationship test.
Adams and Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967), see note 13 supra, indicate
that the total denial of the right to an election on certain matters does not infringe
upon a fundamental right. The extension made by Salyer is that the Court found that
neither restrictions on the franchise nor weighted voting abridged a fundamental right
even when an election was provided.
123. See note 92 supra.
124. See note 15 supra; Note, The Impact of Voter Equality on the Representational
Structure of Local Government, 39 U. CH. L. Rav. 639 (1972).

